Deregulation Pas de Deux: Dual Regulatory Classes of Financial Institutions and the Path to Financial Crisis in Sweden and the United States by Gerding, Erik F.
University of Colorado Law School
Colorado Law Scholarly Commons
Articles Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship
2010
Deregulation Pas de Deux: Dual Regulatory
Classes of Financial Institutions and the Path to
Financial Crisis in Sweden and the United States
Erik F. Gerding
University of Colorado Law School
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the
Comparative and Foreign Law Commons
Copyright Statement
Copyright protected. Use of materials from this collection beyond the exceptions provided for in the Fair Use and Educational Use clauses of the U.S.
Copyright Law may violate federal law. Permission to publish or reproduce is required.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship at Colorado Law Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Colorado Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
erik.beck@colorado.edu.
Citation Information
Erik F. Gerding, Deregulation Pas de Deux: Dual Regulatory Classes of Financial Institutions and the Path to Financial Crisis in Sweden and
the United States, 15 NEXUS 135 (2010), available at http://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles/213.
+ 2(,1 1/,1(
Citation: 15 NEXUS 135 2009-2010 
Provided by: 
William A. Wise Law Library
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Tue Feb 28 16:38:04 2017
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
Deregulation Pas De Deux: Dual
Regulatory Classes of Financial
Institutions and the Path to
Financial Crisis in Sweden and
The United States
Erik F. Gerding*
This article presents a political econ-
omy model in which two classes of finan-
cial institutions subject to different
regulatory regimes interact in financial
and political markets. This interaction
spurs deregulation and riskier lending
and investment, which in turn contrib-
utes to the severity of a financial crisis.
This model has the following six stages:
1) Regulation creates two categories of fi-
nancial institutions. The first class faces
greater restrictions in lending or invest-
ment activities but enjoys regulatory sub-
sidies, such as an explicit or implicit
government guarantee, while the second
class is more loosely regulated and can
participate in riskier loan or investment
markets and earn additional profits. 2)
These additional profits lead to calls for
deregulation to enable the first class to
participate in the same lucrative lending
or investment markets. 3) Deregulation
allows the first class of institution either
to compete with the second class in the
same markets or to invest in the second
class, in either case, while retaining its
regulatory subsidy. 4) Deregulation
spurs additional lending not only by al-
* Associate Professor of Law, the University of New Mexico School of Law. The author wishes to thank
the UNM Law Library faculty for research assistance and Adam Feibelman, Saule Omarova, Barak Orbach,
David Reiss, Carol Rose, Arthur Wilmarth, participants at the NeXus symposium and the Southwest/West
Junior Law Faculty Workshop at the Arizona State University O'Connor College of Law, and the law faculties
at the University of Arizona and the University of Georgia for comments. The author would also like to
acknowledge his former student, Tim Turnbow, whose student paper on the Swedish government's response to
its financial crisis introduced him to the deregulation of the Swedish financial sector in the 1980s.
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lowing the first class to increase its total
volume of lending and investment, but
also in two subtler ways: i) subsidy leak-
age, which occurs when the first class can
use subsidized funds to make riskier in-
vestments (including investments in the
second class) without regulation compen-
sating for moral hazard; and ii) displace-
ment, which occurs when subsidized
competition pushes the second class into
riskier market segments. 5) Additional
lending increases leverage in the finan-
cial system and fuels a boom in an asset
market. 6) Asset prices collapse and
threaten the solvency of financial institu-
tions. This model explains financial der-
egulation in Sweden in the 1980s, which
led to a 1990 bank crisis. The model also
provides a framework for scholars to ex-
amine whether deregulation in the
United States involving the following
dual classes of institutions contributed to
the current crisis:
GSEs (Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae)
and sponsors of "private label" mortgage-
backed securities;
Commercial and investment banks
with respect to the Glass-Steagall repeal;
and
Banks and hedge funds with respect
to OTC derivatives.
The model would support the prem-
ises of the proposed Volcker Rule, which
would restrict investment activities of
banks, but suggests that imposing those
restrictions may not be sustainable in the
long run.
I. Introduction
Historians, economists, legal scholars
and others have written much about the
historical pattern of deregulation preced-
ing financial crises. Some have sug-
gested that deregulation may cause
financial crises or contribute to their se-
verity by leaving economies vulnerable
when a financial crisis hits.' Still other
scholars have laid the fault not on less
regulation, but instead on the failure of
existing and newly introduced regula-
tions.2 This article uses deregulation in a
more ecumenical sense to mean regula-
tory changes that enabled increased lend-
ing and risk-taking by financial
institutions - including the rolling back
of financial regulations, under-enforce-
ment of regulations, or even government
intervention to push financial institu-
1. For just a small sample of the literature arguing that deregulation played a critical causal role in the
current global credit crisis, see James Crotty, Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis: a Critical As-
sessment of the New Financial Architecture, 33 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 563 (2009); Patricia A. McCoy et al.,
Systemic Risk through Securitization: The Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REv.
1327 (2009) (arguing that deregulation and failures of regulators to address asset-backed securities markets
led to a housing bubble and widespread fraud); Brian J.M. Quinn, The Failure of Private Ordering and the
Financial Crisis of 2008, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 549 (2009).
2. Some scholars assert that the crisis stemmed not from deregulation but from failed or flawed regula-
tion. E.g. Charles W. Calomiris, Another "Deregulation" Myth, American Enterprise Institute On the Issues
2008-57 (Oct. 2009), available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20081029_57236240TICalomiris-g.pdf (last visited
Jan. 10, 2010) (arguing that the Securities and Exchange Commission's 2004 change to its net capital rule,
widely blamed for contributing to the severity of the crisis, is an example of flawed new regulation rather than
deregulation).
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tions to make more loans or take on more
risk.3 This article examines one particu-
lar way in which deregulation of financial
institutions may take shape and increase
the risk and severity of a crisis. This arti-
cle describes how dual regulatory classes
of financial institutions may interact
with one another in both the financial
and political marketplaces to spur der-
egulation and then riskier lending by in-
stitutions, which in turn increases the
probability and severity of a financial cri-
sis. These interactions can be described
by a model with the following elements:
1) Financial regulation creates two
categories of institutions that provide
similar functional services:
a) The first class of institution faces
greater restrictions in its lending or in-
vestment activities, but enjoys a higher
degree of explicit or implicit backing from
the government or other regulatory sub-
sidies than the second class.
b) The second class is more loosely
regulated and can take on more risk and
earn additional profits by making certain
categories of loans or investments.
2) Profits by the second class leads to
calls for deregulation to allow the first
class to participate in the same lucrative
lending or investment markets.
3) Deregulation allows the first class
of institution either:
a) To compete with the second class
in the same (formerly restricted) mar-
kets, or
b) To lend to, or invest in, the second
class, in either case, while the first class
retains its regulatory subsidy.
4) Deregulation spurs additional
lending not only by allowing the first
class to increase its total volume of lend-
ing and investment, but also in two sub-
tler ways:
a) Subsidy leakage, which describes
when the first class can use subsidized
funds to make riskier investments (in-
cluding investments in the second class of
institution) without regulation ade-
quately compensating for the moral haz-
ard of a government guarantee;4 and
b) Displacement, a term this paper
coins to describe when subsidized compe-
tition5 pushes the second class into risk-
ier market segments.
5) Additional lending increases over-
all leverage in the financial system and
fuels a boom in an asset market such as
real estate or securities.
6) Ultimately, asset prices collapse
and threaten the solvency of financial in-
stitutions, starting with the class of insti-
tution that lacks explicit or implicit
government backing.
This model aptly describes the der-
egulation of the Swedish financial ser-
3. This definition is in keeping with the author's definition of deregulation in Erik F. Gerding, The Next
Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of Securities Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REv. 393, 404 (2006). A
broader definition of deregulation has the disadvantage of making the model looser. The author, however,
believes that this risk is outweighed by the benefit of a richer conception of "law" and "regulation" that might
not be captured by a narrower definition or purely quantifiable measures.
4. John R. Walter, Can a Safety Net Subsidy Be Contained?, 84 FED. REs. BANK RICHMOND 1, 11 (1998).
5. Id. John Walter describes how a subsidy could lead to growth of banks at the expense of unsubsidized
competitors, but does not describe how the competition could force those competitors into riskier segments.
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vices sector in the 1980s, which led to a
severe real estate crisis in that country in
1990.6 The Swedish government's re-
sponse to the ensuing crisis became the
subject of intense study and debate in the
United States in 2008, as U.S. policymak-
ers searched for models for managing
their own deepening financial crisis.7
However, it is not only Sweden's policy
response to its crisis that sheds light on
the U.S. financial meltdown; Sweden's
history of deregulation preceding its 1990
crisis and the model outlined above may
also illuminate how deregulation contrib-
uted to the current financial crisis in the
United States. The model outlined by
this article - which might be labeled "der-
egulation pas de deux" - provides a
framework for analyzing the extent to
which several examples of deregulation of
financial institutions in the United
States contributed to the severity of the
current financial crisis. The model can be
used for needed empirical study of the ex-
tent to which deregulation affecting the
following dual classes of financial institu-
tions contributed to the severity of the
current credit crisis in the United States:
The government sponsored entities
(GSEs) Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae on
the one hand, and sponsors of "private la-
bel" mortgage-backed securities on the
other;"
Commercial and investment banks
with respect to the repeal of the Glass-
Steagall Act that separated those two
classes of financial institutions;9 and
Banks and hedge funds with respect
to over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives.o
More particularly, the model allows
scholars to focus on two questions for fu-
ture econometric research. First, to what
extent did the deregulation of GSE in-
vestments, the repeal of Glass-Steagall
prohibitions on commercial banks activi-
ties, and regulatory actions that allowed
banks to invest in OTC derivatives result
in either market displacement of less reg-
ulated and less-subsidized financial insti-
tutions or subsidy leakage? Second, to
what extent did any resultant market
displacement or subsidy leakage increase
riskier investments by financial institu-
tions, fuel the increase of housing and as-
set-backed securities prices that
ultimately crashed, and increase the lev-
erage and thus the vulnerability of finan-
cial institutions to a market crash?
The pas de deux model argues for a
reexamination of studies (which are dis-
6. See infra Part II.
7. Carter Dougherty, Stopping a Financial Crisis, the Swedish Way, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2008, at C9;
James K. Jackson, The U.S. Financial Crisis: Lessons from Sweden, Congressional Research Service Report for
Congress, Sept. 29, 2008, available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/110770.pdf (last visited Sep-
tember 10, 2009).
8. The GSEs and private label securitization are described in infra Part IV.a.
9. The Glass-Steagall Act was formally known as the Banking Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 162 (1933). It was
repealed in 1999 by the Gramm Leach Bliley Act, formally known as the Financial Services Modernization Act
of 1999, Pub.L. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, enacted November 12, 1999. The Glass-Steagall Act and its repeal
are analyzed in infra Part IV.b.
10. Regulation and the relationship between banks and hedge funds in OTC derivatives are discussed in
infra Part IV.c.
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cussed in Part IV.b.) conducted just
before the repeal of the Glass-Steagall
Act that examined whether the repeal
would result in deposit insurance subsi-
dizing riskier bank investments that
were off-limits under that Depression era
statute." The pas de deux model can
thus frame the empirical research needed
to evaluate current financial reform pro-
posals, particularly the so-called "Volcker
Rule," a still vague Obama Administra-
tion proposal first announced in January
2010 that would restrict proprietary trad-
ing by bank holding companies.12 The
Volcker Rule appears to be premised in
large measure on the argument that sub-
sidy leakage contributed to the current fi-
nancial crisis; in other words, banks
allegedly used funds subsidized with a
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
guarantee to make investments in asset-
backed securities and hedge funds. 3
Beyond immediate policy debates, the
pas de deux model reveals two more gen-
eral risks. First, the model highlights the
inherent legal, political, and economic in-
stability of creating separate dual classes
of financial institutions that provide
functionally similar economic services. A
sharp legal division between classes of in-
stitutions will be subject to political and
economic pressure, as less regulated in-
stitutions earn higher profits and capture
more market share. This creates incen-
tives for the more regulated class both to
develop legal "work-arounds" to sidestep
regulatory restrictions on their lending
and investment and to push for deregula-
tion to enable them to compete.' 4 Second,
the model - and particularly the risk of
displacement and subsidy leakage argues
11. See infra notes 110-119 and accompanying text.
12. President Barack Obama, Remarks on Additional Reforms to the Financial System (Jan. 21, 2010),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-financial-reform (last visited Jan.
23, 2010)[hereinafter "President Obama Remarks"]; Prohibiting Certain High-Risk Investment Activities by
Banks and Bank Holding Companies: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Af-
fairs, 111th Cong. - (Feb. 2, 2010)(statement of Paul Volcker, Former Chairman of the Federal Reserve
Board), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Testimony&Hearing
ID=54b42ccO-7ecd-4cOd-88cO-65f7d2002061&WitnessID=091f5a89-dec4-4905-9fal-678bfbec823a (last visited
Feb. 4, 2010) [hereinafter "Volcker Testimony"]. See also Jackie Calmes & Louis Uchitelle, Obama to Propose
Limits on Risks Taken by Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2010 at Al.
13. See President Obama Remarks, supra note 12 ("These are rules that allowed firms to act contrary to
the interests of customers, to conceal their exposure to debt through complex financial dealings, to benefit from
taxpayer-insured deposits while making speculative investments. . ."); Volcker Testimony, supra note 12. For-
mer Federal Reserve Chairman Volcker, now an advisor to the Obama Administration, explained that part of
the rationale for the proposed restrictions on bank proprietary trading was to prevent government subsidies
from supporting risky speculation: "The basic point is that there has been, and remains, a strong public inter-
est in providing a "safety net" -in particular, deposit insurance and the provision of liquidity in emergencies -
for commercial banks carrying out essential services. There is not, however, a similar rationale for public funds
taxpayer funds - protecting and supporting essentially proprietary and speculative activities. Hedge funds,
private equity funds, and trading activities unrelated to customer needs and continuing banking relationships
should stand on their own, without the subsidies implied by public support for depository institutions." Id.
14. Developing regulatory "work-arounds" for clients represents an essential role of transactional and
regulatory attorneys, whom Professor Ronald Gilson has famously called "transaction cost engineers." See
Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L J. 239, 243
(1984).
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that when deregulation of a subsidized
class of financial institution occurs, regu-
lators must either remove the subsidy or
actively and continuously adjust pruden-
tial regulation of that deregulated class
to counteract the potential for abuse of
that subsidy. Otherwise, deregulation
might allow the deregulated but still sub-
sidized class of institutions to compete
unfairly with an unsubsidized second
class and drive that second class into
riskier market segments. Alternatively,
deregulation might allow the deregulated
but still subsidized class to use its gov-
ernment subsidy to place bets using tax-
payer funds.
It is important to underscore the lim-
ited scope of this article and the model it
describes. The model does not seek to ex-
plain all examples of the deregulation of
financial institutions. 15  Nor does the
model seek to provide an explanation for
all asset price booms or financial crises or
even an exclusive explanation of particu-
lar booms and crises. Indeed, scholars
have examined how other factors, such as
monetary policy, trade imbalances, and
exchange rate shifts contributed to the
Swedish financial crises and the current
global crisis.16 The pas de deux model de-
scribed below, nevertheless, may serve as
a valuable complement to these other ex-
planations. The model provides a tem-
plate upon which two historical episodes
of deregulation crises may be evaluated.
To the extent that Sweden and the U.S.
examples fit this model, then scholars
should consider looking for other historic
examples of dual regulatory classes of fi-
nancial institutions that came to compete
in the same lending and investment mar-
kets. Testing more historical examples
could then address a number of questions
including, whether other dual classes of
financial institutions providing similar
functional services or competing in the
same market space led to deregulation of
the more regulated class, the extent to
which this type of deregulation then led
to a lending or investment boom, and the
extent to which subsidy leakage or dis-
placement occurred.
This article proceeds as follows: Part
II elaborates on the deregulation pas de
deux model. Part III outlines how the
deregulation of financial institutions in
Sweden in the 1980s fits this model. Part
IV examines whether this model can ex-
plain the interaction and deregulation of
several classes of regulated entities in the
15. For a survey of literature on the connection between financial liberalization and asset booms, see
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Does Financial Liberalization Increase the Likelihood of a Systemic Banking Crisis?
Evidence from the Past Three Decades and the Great Depression, in Too-BIG-To-FAIL: POLICIES AND PRACTICES
IN GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS 77 (Benton E. Gup, ed., 2003).
16. E.g., Urban Backstrdm, What Lessons Can be Learned from Recent Financial Crises? The Swedish
Experience, 1997 FED. RES. BANK K.C. PROCEEDINGS 129 (exploring expansionary monetary conditions that led
to Swedish crisis); JOHN B. TAYLOR, GETTING OFF TRACK: How GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AND INTERVENTIONS
CAUSED, PROLONGED, AND WORSENED THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (2009)(examining causes of current global crisis
with a focus on monetary policy); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial
Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 1005-08 (2009)(identi-
fying following factors leading to global credit boom preceding current crisis: (i) lax U.S. monetary policy; (ii)
exchange rate policies of Asian and oil-exporting nations; (iii) social contagion of "boom thinking"; and (iv)
financial conglomerates).
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United States in the 1990s and 2000s.
Part V concludes and sketches policy im-
plications of the pas de deux model, in-
cluding for the Volcker Rule.
II. The Model
This Part elaborates on the nuances
and some variations in the six elements
of the pas de deux model of deregulation
outlined in the introduction:
1) Two categories of financial institu-
tions: The model assumes a regulatory
regime that has two categories of finan-
cial institutions that provide functionally
similar economic services. The first cate-
gory of institution is more tightly regu-
lated and faces restrictions on its
business activities, including on particu-
lar types of loans or other investments it
can make. These restrictions might take
various forms, including:
regulations that limit financial insti-
tutions to particular lines of business to
shield them from excessive losses and to
allow regulators to assess better the risks
that the institutions face;17 restrictions
on the types of investments that financial
institutions may make, including, for ex-
ample, restrictions on investments in real
estate'8 and riskier classes of securities,
such as equity;' 9 prudential restrictions
on the number of loans to certain types of
borrowers;20 and caps on interest rates
that banks may charge their borrowers21
or offer to their depositors.22
In return for being subject to these
regulatory restrictions, this first class of
institution enjoys certain regulatory sub-
sidies. This subsidy may take the form of
a government guarantee that may be ex-
plicit (for example, deposit insurance") or
implicit (for example, a widely held per-
ception in the marketplace that a govern-
ment would back the debts of this type of
institution should it become insolvent).
One variant on this implicit guarantee is
the "too-big-to-fail" (or "too-intercon-
17. For example, U.S. federal banking law circumscribes the non-banking commercial business in which
banks may engage or own. See e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2008) (enumerating powers of national banks).
18. E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 29 (2008) (restricting ability of national banks to invest in real estate).
19. Supra note 17 (specifying categories of securities investments which national banks are permitted to
make).
20. For example, U.S. federal banking laws limit the loans that banks may have outstanding to one
borrower. 12 U.S.C. §§ 84, 1464(u) (2008); 12 C.F.R. § 32.1(b) (2008). Another set of laws restrict a bank's
loans to other depositary institutions to prevent the collapse of one institution from threatening others. 12
U.S.C. § 371b-2 (2008); 12 C.F.R. § 206 (2008).
21. For a description of how federal law in the United States has cut back on state usury laws, see
Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. REG. 121, 148 (2004); Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and
Predatory Lending: Unmasking the Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 35-37 (2005); Elizabeth R.
Schlitz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine and its Effect on Predatory Lending Regu-
lation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518 (2004).
22. For example, the Federal Reserve Board's now defunct Regulation Q imposed caps on the interest
rates depository institutions could offer to depositors. 12 CFR Pt. 217 (1979). The Depositary Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 required the phased elimination of Regulation Q. Pub. L. No.
96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) See R. Alton Gilbert, Requiem for
Regulation Q: What It Did and Why It Passed Away, FED. REs. BANK ST. Louis REv. 22 (Feb. 1986).
23. Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEo L.J. 193, 210 (2008) (describing deposit insurance as a
tool to mitigate systemic risk).
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nected-to-fail") financial institution;
scholars have argued that many inves-
tors believe that the government would
have to assume the obligations of large,
"systemically significant" financial insti-
tutions - even absent an explicit guaran-
tee - because the insolvency of those
institutions might trigger severe cascad-
ing losses in financial markets.24Regula-
tory subsidies may take still other forms
such as tax breaks or exemptions from
other fields of regulation, such as securi-
ties regulation. Institutions in the sec-
ond regulatory category do not enjoy
these subsidies (or at least not to the
same extent as the first category), but are
also not subject to the same restrictions
on lending, investment, or business oper-
ations.
The tradeoff in this dual regulatory
scheme has a certain economic logic. If
the government grants a regulatory sub-
sidy - particularly a guarantee - to a
class of institution it wants to limit risk-
taking to mitigate moral hazard.25 This
division may also offer creditors of (in-
cluding depositors) and investors in fi-
nancial institutions a choice between
lower risk (the first class) and higher re-
ward (the second class). The restrictions
on the first class of institution not only
limit excessive risk-taking, but prevent
that class of institution from using its
regulatory subsidy to gain a competitive
advantage over the second class (a topic
discussed in more detail in Part II, Sec-
tion 5 below).
2) Pressure to deregulate of the first
class of institution: The second class of in-
stitutions earns higher profits on the ac-
tivities that are foreclosed to the first
category. This success may occur because
higher risk produces higher reward or,
more particularly, because a specific loan
or investment market begins to heat up.
The less regulated second class may win
market share as investors or borrowers
flock to the market segment closed to the
more regulated class of financial institu-
tion. These profits of the second class
create pressure to relax the restrictions
on the first category to allow those insti-
tutions to participate in that same lucra-
tive market. This push for deregulation
24. For an earlier article analyzing "too-big-to-fail" financial institutions, see Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.,
Too Big to Fail, Too Few to Serve? The Potential Risks of Nationwide Banks, 77 IOWA L. REV. 957 (1992). See
also Walter, supra note 4, at 7-8 (A more recent variant of the "too-big-to-fail" concern is the "too-intercon-
nected-to fail" financial institution. Under this theory, a government may not allow some financial institutions
to fail for fear of the repercussions to their financial institution counterparties.). See Onnig H. Dombalagian,
Requiem for the Bulge Bracket?: Revisiting Investment Bank Regulation, 85 IND. L. J. _ (forthcoming 2010).
It is difficult, however, to detect an implicit guarantee ex ante. A subsequent government bailout of a financial
institution does not necessarily mean that the institution or financial markets behaved before the bailout as if
the institution enjoyed an implicit guarantee. A more rigorous ex ante test of an implicit guarantee might
compare the credit spreads of a financial institution with those of similar financial institutions not believed to
enjoy a guarantee.
25. Moral hazard refers to the perverse incentives for insured parties to take on excessive risk. For an
analysis of how deposit insurance may contribute to moral hazard, see Patricia A. McCoy, The Moral Hazard
Implications of Deposit Insurance: Theory and Evidence, in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, CURRENT DEVEL-
OPMENTS IN MONETARY AND FINANCIAL LAW, Vol. 5 417 (2008), available at http://www.imf.org/External/NP/
seminars/eng/2006/mfl/pam.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2010).
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can come from various sources. These
sources might include:
the institutions in the first category
or their investors (both of which groups
are motivated by the prospect of in-
creased profits);politicians interested in
the subsidized entities becoming more
competitive or less dependent on the gov-
ernment subsidy;
regulators looking to minimize regu-
latory arbitrage caused by dual classes of
entities; and groups pursuing other social
objectives, such as increasing the availa-
bility of credit to consumers and busi-
nesses.
Arguments for deregulation may in-
clude rhetoric in favor of "leveling the
playing field" for the more heavily regu-
lated institution. Pressure to deregulate
the first class of entities may be aug-
mented by a number of factors. An exten-
sive literature in political economy
suggests that political capture (i.e. when
an interest group, such as a sector of in-
dustry, captures political branches) and
regulatory capture (i.e. when an interest
group captures regulatory agencies)
might contribute to the deregulation de-
scribed by this article's model. Public
choice theories of regulation have articu-
lated conditions under which interest
groups (for example, a sector of the finan-
cial services industry) may successfully
push policymakers to deregulate. 2 6 For
example, an interest group with a small,
cohesive number of members, significant
resources, and a large stake in a regula-
tory outcome can exercise greater influ-
ence over regulation and deregulation. A
comprehensive public choice analysis of
deregulation in Sweden and the United
States is beyond the scope of this article.
Nevertheless, the pas de deux model de-
scribed herein meshes with a public
choice analysis of regulation. The pas de
deux model explains why interest groups,
such as the first class of institution, have
strong incentives to push for deregula-
tion. On the other hand, economic theo-
ries of regulation might explain when the
presence of dual regulatory classes re-
sults in deregulation of the first class
rather than tighter regulation of the first
class.2 7
3) Deregulation takes shape but the
subsidy remains: The political pressure
to deregulate culminates in loosening the
26. For a small sample of the germinal public choice literature on regulatory capture and deregulation,
see George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL. J. EcON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971); Sam
Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory ofRegulation, 19 J. L. EcoN. 211 (1976); Gary S. Becker, A Theory of
Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q. J. EcoN. 371 (1983); Richard A. Posner,
Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL. J. EcoN. & MGMT. Sci. 335 (1974). For an account of political capture
in banking regulation, see Jonathan R. Macey, The Political Science of Regulating Bank Risk, 49 OHIo ST. L.J.
1277 (1989).
27. For example, the first class of institutions as a group may calculate that it will earn larger profits by
being deregulated (yet retaining a subsidy) rather than the second class being more tightly regulated. The
first class might also calculate that deregulation might be more rewarding because other political actors might
have difficulty identifying the persistent government subsidy and arguing for its removal. Regulating the
second class, by contrast, might allow institutions in that class to share that same subsidy with the first class.
Whether the first class gets deregulated or the second class gets regulated, and who enjoys a government
subsidy depends on the political resources and strategies of the various political actors.
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restrictions on the first class of institu-
tion in one or two ways:
Direct competition: deregulation may
allow the first class of institution to com-
pete directly with the second class of in-
stitution in previously restricted (or even
off-limits) lending or investment mar-
kets.
Symbiotic lending or investment: al-
ternatively, deregulation may allow the
first class to extend credit to or invest in
the second class. This allows the first
class to increase its indirect participation
in those lucrative, riskier lending or in-
vestment markets. These two forms of
deregulation are not mutually exclusive;
policymakers may implement both simul-
taneously or sequentially. Regardless of
the form of deregulation, after it occurs,
the first class still retains much of its
government subsidy.
4) Consequences of deregulation: Reg-
ulators often fail to ensure that other ap-
propriate prudential regulatory
safeguards are in place, including ade-
quate supervision of the newly deregu-
lated class and enforcement of existing
regulations. Deregulation combined with
a government subsidy may result in in-
creases in overall lending or investment
in a particular market. To some extent,
this may result merely from an increase
in the volume of lending or investment by
the previously pent-up first class of insti-
tution. Deregulation may also result in
two subtler effects::
a) Subsidy leakage: Without ade-
quate safeguards, the deregulated finan-
cial institutions may take on excessive
risk due to subsidized government funds
or the moral hazard of a government
guarantee. This risk-taking comes in the
forms of new loans or investments that
were previously off-limits. The govern-
ment subsidy of a deregulated firm's core
activities - such as bank lending from de-
positor funds - begins to leak to the new
investment activities of the institution.28
This leakage may be intrafirm - if the in-
stitution uses funds from a subsidized af-
filiate to fund investment operations of a
less regulated affiliate2 9 - Or interfirm - if
the institution uses subsidized funds to
invest in an unaffiliated entity (such as a
financial institution in the second, less
regulated class). The new investment ac-
tivities thus shifts greater risk to a gov-
ernment guarantee originally intended to
provide more limited protection (for ex-
ample, protecting bank depositors)
against more traditional risks (for exam-
ple, bank runs) with taxpayers bearing
greater risk.30
b) Displacement: if deregulation al-
lows the first class to compete with the
second class, the unsubsidized second
class may face a competitive disadvan-
28. Walter, supra note 4, at 11. Arthur Wilmarth argued in 2002 that banks that were "too-big-to-fail"
could transfer this implicit subsidy to ("cross-subsidize") non-bank affiliates. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The
Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased
Risk, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 215, 446-449.
29. Intrafirm subsidies may take the form of intracompany loans, or asset purchases, dividends, or eq-
uity investments in direct subsidiaries. Walter, supra note 4, at 11-13.
30. Id. at 11.
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tage.3 1 The government subsidy may af-
ford the first class a lower cost of
capital.32 For example, deposit insurance
or an implicit government guarantee al-
lows the first class of institution to raise
capital more cheaply. If deregulation al-
lows the first class to form a new busi-
ness unit to compete with the second
class in a new market, this lower cost of
capital may enable institutions in the
first class to cross-subsidize that business
unit. This competitive advantage enjoyed
by the first class of institution enables
those institutions to gain market share
and pushes the unsubsidized second class
of entities into riskier market segments.
For example, the second class of institu-
tion newly forced to compete in a loan
market with the first class may lower un-
derwriting standards and extend loans to
less creditworthy borrowers.
5) Increased Lending and Leverage
Fuels Market Boom: Either displacement
or symbiotic lending increases the overall
level of lending in the economy. Higher
asset prices may in turn generate various
feedback loops. For example, higher
prices may encourage further risky lend-
ing, mask inadequate underwriting stan-
dards, and lull regulators, creditors, and
investors into a false sense of security.33
Alternatively, Professor John Ge-
anakoplos has recently outlined how a
feedback loop may develop through what
he labels the leverage cycle. This cycle
may be summarized as follows: when
firms investing in an asset market in-
crease their leverage, more money flows
into asset markets causing prices to rise.
Rising prices increase the value of the
collateral that leveraged firms have
posted. Higher-valued collateral frees up
the firms to invest additional capital,
causing asset prices and the value of col-
lateral to rise even further. A feedback
loop develops.34
6) Asset Prices Collapse and Finan-
cial Crisis: Ultimately, asset prices col-
lapse and threaten the solvency of
financial institutions starting with the
second class of institution that was forced
into riskier market segments. If asset
prices fall far enough and enough borrow-
ers default, the first class of institution
may also be threatened, triggering gov-
ernment guarantees.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 10.
33. This is what some scholars argue happened in Sweden after deregulation of banks in the 1980s. See
infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text. Higher asset prices may also reinforce lending when some borrowers
can only repay some types of loans - most recently subprime borrowers and adjustable-rate-mortgages
("ARMs") - by refinancing, which, in turn, can only occur if asset prices appreciate. Stephen G. Ryan, Ac-
counting in and for the Subprime Crisis, 83 ACCOUNTING REV. 1605, 1615 (2008)(analyzing the "binary" nature
of ARMs as only functioning when housing prices rise).
34. However, when asset prices drop, the value of collateral also drops and leveraged firms can be re-
quired by their creditors either to post more collateral or to reduce their leveraged positions. Firms must sell
assets to meet margin calls, which causes asset prices to plummet further. This creates a vicious deleveraging
feedback loop. See e.g., Ana Fostel & John Geanakoplos, Leverage Cycles and the Anxious Economy, 98 Am.
EcoN. REV. 1211 (2008); John Geanakoplos, The Leverage Cycle, COWLES FOUND. DISCUSSION PAPER No. 1715
(July 31, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1441943.
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III. Deregulation in Sweden in
the 1980s
The preceding model provides a good
template for understanding the deregula-
tion of financial institutions in Sweden in
the 1980s that led to the severe 1990 real
estate crisis in that country.35 The Swed-
ish real estate bubble was exacerbated by
interaction of two regulatory classes of fi-
nancial institutions: banks and finance
companies. The regulatory differences
between these two types of institutions
created feedback loops between the finan-
cial and political marketplaces as deregu-
lation, riskier lending practices, and
booming asset prices reinforced one an-
other.
1. Two Categories of Financial Insti-
tutions: In the 1970s, Sweden had a
highly regulated banking sector that was
subject to a series of legal restrictions de-
signed to maintain stable and low inter-
est rates and to direct credit toward
favored economic sectors such as housing
35. The Norwegian and Finnish banking sectors
and public finance.3 6 These regulations
included various measures that re-
stricted the volume of a bank's lending,
including high reserve requirements,
placement requirements, and liquidity
ratios. 7 Together, placement require-
ments and liquidity ratios required that a
certain percentage of bank's lending port-
folio include government and housing
bonds.38 The Swedish central bank also
controlled the volume of bank credit by
using regulation, moral suasion, and ac-
cess to central bank loans to impose
quantitative restrictions on lending by
each bank.3 9 Swedish banks were also
subject to ceilings on the average interest
rates they charge on their loans.40 Al-
though Sweden removed legal caps on the
interest rates that banks could offer de-
positors in the 1970s, a few large banks
continued to dominate the industry, and
the absence of competition4' kept deposit
rates low.42 Together, Swedish bank reg-
ulations ensured that Swedish banks en-
experienced similar deregulation in the 1980s and a
crisis at roughly the same time as Sweden. For economic literature comparing deregulation in Sweden with
that of other Scandinavian countries in the same period, see Lars Jonung, Lessons from Financial Liberalisa-
tion in Scandinavia, 50 CoMP. EcoN. STUD. 564 (2008); Burkhard Drees & Ceyla Pazarbasioglu, The Nordic
Banking Crises: Pitfalls in Financial Liberalization, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND OCCAsIONAL PAPER No.
161 (Apr. 1998); Peter Englund & Vesa Vihrila, Financial Crises in Developed Economies: the Cases of Swe-
den and Finland (Pellervo Econ. Res. Inst. Working Paper No. 63, Mar. 2003), available at http://www.ptt.fil
dokumentit/tp63_1809080802.pdf. (last visited Sept. 10, 2009).
36. Drees & Pazarbasioglu, supra note 35, at 3. See also Bengt Larsson, Neo-liberalism and Polycontex-
tuality: Banking Crisis and Re-regulation in Sweden, 32 EcoN. & Soc'Y 428 (2003).
37. Drees & Pazarbasioglu, supra note 35, at 4.
38. Id. at 5; Peter Englund, The Swedish Banking Crisis: Roots and Consequences, 15 OXFORD REV.
EcoN. PoL'Y 80, 83 (1999).
39. Drees & Pazarbasioglu, supra note 35, at 5. Englund, supra note 38, at 83. The Swedish Central
Bank applied moral suasion through weekly meetings among the head of that institution and senior executives
of private sector banks. Id.
40. Drees & Pazarbasioglu, supra note 35, at 3.
41. This absence of competition resulted from legal prohibitions on entry. From 1945 to 1983, Sweden
granted no new banking licenses. E. PHILLIP DAVIs, DEBT FINANCIAL FRAGILITY AND SYSTEMIC RISK 256 (1995).
42. Drees & Pazarbasioglu, supra note 35, at 3.
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joyed steady, but low profits4 3 and
minimal risk." Although Sweden had no
explicit deposit insurance scheme before
or immediately after deregulation, schol-
ars posit that there was public perception
of implicit deposit insurance - i.e., that
the government would not allow banks to
fail in a financial crisis. 45
Finance companies did not face these
same restrictions and thus were able to
gain a competitive advantage over
banks.4 6  Finance companies were
founded decades earlier in Sweden.47
These lenders started in lending to con-
sumer and small business loans 4 but by
the 1980s had moved into numerous
other lending markets, including factor-
ing and leasing.49 At the same time, fi-
nance companies faced limitations on
funding sources not applicable to banks.
In the late 1980s, Swedish regulations
prohibited finance companies from ac-
cepting deposits from the public or issu-
ing certificates of deposit or bonds.50
Finance companies relied heavily either
on short-maturity loans from banks and
other lenders or on issuing investment
certificates, also with short maturities.5'
Banks thus provided a significant source
of financing for finance companies, which
increased bank exposure when finance
companies later faltered in Sweden's fi-
nancial crisis. 5 2
These less regulated finance compa-
nies began to gain market share over
banks in loans to both businesses and
households.53 Some scholars attribute
this to ballooning public sector debt.
They argue that as public debt increased,
the requirements that banks hold govern-
ment bonds in their portfolio required
them to compensate by curbing loans to
the private sector.5 4 The number of fi-
nance companies expanded from 67 in
43. Id. at 7.
44. Jonung, supra note 35, at 567 ("Banking was rendered an almost risk-free enterprise in this sys-
tem"). Sweden also restricted access by foreign banks to the Swedish market. See Drees & Pazarbasioglu,
supra note 35, at 6.
45. Drees & Pazarbasioglu, supra note 35, at 15.
46. L. Peter Jennergren, The Swedish Finance Company Crisis - Could It Have Been Anticipated?, 50
SCANDINAvIN EcoN. HIsT. REV. 7 (2002); see also Davis, supra note 41, at 256; Dwight M. Jaffee, The Swedish
Real Estate Crisis 82 (Oct. 1994)(unpublished manuscript), available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/jaffee/
Papers/Sweden.pdf. (last visited Sept. 10, 2009).
47. There is some disagreement over when finance companies first began. Compare Davis, supra note
41, at 256 (asserting finance companies were an innovation of the 1920s and 1930s) with Jennergren, supra
note 46, at [4] ("Finance companies started in the 1960s.").
48. Davis, supra note 41, at 256.
49. Id.; Englund, supra note 38, at 85; see generally Jennergren, supra note 46 (describing forms of credit
provided by finance companies).
50. Jennergren, supra note 46.
51. Id.; Englund, supra note 38, at 85.
52. Englund, supra note 38, at 85.
53. Jennergren, supra note 46; Drees & Pazarbasioglu, supra note 35, at 9. See also Englund, supra note
38, at 85.
54. Drees & Pazarbasioglu, supra note 35, at 9.
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1970 to 292 in 1988.55 Scholars have cat-
egorized the rise of finance companies in
Sweden as part of the growth of a "grey
credit market."56 Swedish banks re-
sponded to competition from the grey
market by establishing their own finance
company subsidiaries.57
2. Push for Deregulation: The Swed-
ish government grew concerned that its
bank regulatory regime was increasingly
being circumvented by the growth of fi-
nance companies and other sources of
credit.5 Scholars have also cited a desire
to increase bank profits as a goal of regu-
lators in deregulation.59 Other scholars
have characterized deregulation of the fi-
nancial sector as part of a larger "ne-
oliberal" political movement that aimed
to shrink the public sector and welfare
state.60
3. Deregulation: Regardless of the
reason, from 1983 to 1985, among other
liberalization reforms, Sweden repealed
liquidity ratios, removed ceilings on bank
loan rates, lifted volume restrictions on
loans, and abolished placement ratios.61
4. Deregulation Enables Increased
Lending: In the wake of deregulation,
pent up consumer and business demand
for credit exploded.62 Deregulated banks
dramatically expanded lending in part to
meet surging demand and recapture mar-
ket share in an increasingly competitive
market.63 Competitive pressures and the
pursuit of increased profits drove dra-
matically increased bank lending, partic-
ularly to the real estate sector, but also to
other riskier and more cyclical economic
sectors. 64 One scholar argues that der-
egulation resulted in a shift in bank port-
folios that dramatically increased bank
exposures to credit risk.65
It appears that deregulation of banks
did result in displacement by pushing fi-
nance companies to riskier market seg-
ments. For example, the ensuing
competition in real estate loans pushed
finance companies to enter more margi-
nal lending markets and take on higher
credit risk.66 Finance companies began
extending loans to applicants previously
rejected by banks, extending real estate
loans with only junior security interests,
55. Davis, supra note 41, at 256. In 1988, finance companies collectively held assets of 171 billion Swed-
ish kroner. Id.
56. Drees & Pazarbasioglu, supra note 35, at 9.
57. Drees & Pazarbasioglu, supra note 35, at 9-10.
58. Id.; Englund, supra note 38, at 84.
59. Jaffee, supra note 46, at 89-90.
60. See Timothy A. Canova, The Swedish Model Betrayed, 37 CHALLENGE 36 (May-June 1994) (describing
politics of deregulation); Brian Burkitt & Phil Whyman, The Origins of the Recent Swedish Crisis: a Lesson for
the European Left, 93:4 EUR. Bus. REv. 33 (1993); Larsson, supra note 36.
61. Drees & Pazarbasioglu, supra note 35, at 10; Davis, supra note 41, at 256; Peter Englund, Financial
Deregulation in Sweden, 34 EUR. ECON. REV. 385, 385-86 (1990); Englund, supra note 38, at 83.
62. Drees & Pazarbasioglu, supra note 35, at 12-14.
63. Id. at 15; Jaffee, supra note 46, at 84. See also Englund, supra note 38, at 84.
64. Drees & Pazarbasioglu, supra note 35, at 15; Jaffee, supra note 46, at 86-89 (noting, however, that
Swedish bank statistics do not track real estate loans as a separate category).
65. Jaffee, supra note 46, at 84-87.
66. Jennergren, supra note 46; Englund, supra note 38, at 85.
148
Erik F. Gerding
investing in highly leveraged commercial
real estate projects, and financing invest-
ments in equity securities.6 7 Analyzing
whether subsidy leakage occurred is
more complex. The government guaran-
tee of bank obligations was at best im-
plicit. 68 Nevertheless, banks continued to
enjoy lower funding costs via regulatory
restrictions on the funding sources of fi-
nance companies.6 1 (This regulatory ad-
vantage of banks may also have played a
role in the displacement of finance com-
panies.).7o Moreover, scholars have noted
that banks provided significant levels of
credit to finance companies.7 1
5. Asset market boom: Increased
lending and lower underwriting stan-
dards fueled a dramatic lending boom;
the ratio of bank loans to total GDP
skyrocketed just as financial sector der-
egulation ended in 1986.72 One scholar
argues that increases in bank real estate
lending resulted in a feedback loop, as in-
creased lending stimulated further in-
creases in real estate prices and demand
for real estate.7 3 This boom reinforced
risky loan underwriting practices.7 4
Lenders dramatically increased their
loan-to-value ratios for mortgages for
owner-occupied residences.7 5 The boom
also lowered the guard of regulators;
scholars have faulted Swedish bank regu-
lators for failing to strengthen and adapt
prudential safety-and-soundness bank
regulation to a more competitive, deregu-
lated lending environment.7 6
Some economists contend that bank
deregulation precipitated the boom in
67. Jennergren, supra note 46; Davis, supra note 41, at 256.
68. See supra note 45, and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 50-51, and accompanying text.
70. See Jennergren, supra note 46; Englund, supra note 38, at 89-90.
71. See supra note 52, and accompanying text.
72. Drees & Pazarbasioglu, supra note 35, at 13. For other data on the extent of the lending boom, see
Englund, supra note 38, at 84-86.
73. Jaffee, supra note46, at 88.
74. Drees & Pazarbasioglu, supra note 35, at 15. In terms of lowered loan underwriting standards, the
following account of Drees and Pazarbasioglu has eerie parallels to accounts of the U.S. subprime crisis: The
shift to more price competition weakened traditionally close banking relationships and impaired banks? ability
to assess credit risks and monitor borrowers. Id.
75. Englund, supra note 38, at 85.
76. Drees & Pazarbasioglu, supra note 35, at 21; Jonung, supra note 35, at 581-82, 587-88; Backstrdm,
supra note 16, at 138; Martin Andersson & Staffan Viotti, Managing and Preventing Financial Crises - Les-
sons from the Swedish Experience, 1 SVERIGES RIKSBANK Q. REV. 71, 77 (1999).
Some commentators fault regulators for failing to recognize the dangers of high concentrations of real
estate loans and the foreign exchange risk created by a large number of loans being denominated in foreign
currencies but in which the assets were denominated in the local currency. See Stefan Ingves & Goran Lind,
Stockholm Solutions, INT'L MONETARY FUND FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT, Dec. 2008, at 21, 22, available at https:/
/www.imf.org/external/Pubs/FT/fandd/2008/12/pdflingves.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2010).
Another scholar questions whether real estate lending was directly regulated at all and faults bankers
and supervisors for failing to consider excessive concentrations of loans in specific sectors, the need for con-
servative initial underwriting in new loan markets, and the importance of careful valuations of the collateral
and cash flows available to service each loan. Jaffee, supra note 46, at 90.
For a devastating critique of the lack of understanding of regulators of the need to adjust prudential
regulation in a deregulated financial sectors, see Director Stefan Ingves, Monetary and Exchange Affairs De-
partment, Banking, Insurance and Securities Commission of Norway, The Nordic Banking Crisis from an In-
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lending and asset prices.77 Others find
that, although this deregulation was not
the catalyst for the initial lending boom
and economic expansion, it did magnify
those trends.78 Deregulation stimulated
a competition among financial institu-
tions, in which lenders focused on expan-
sion rather than prudent lending
practices.7 1
6. Crisis: The lending boom and rise
in asset prices ended in dramatic fashion
in 1989, as depreciation of the Swedish
currency triggered massive defaults on
the growing number of domestic loans de-
nominated in foreign currencies.80 A rise
in nonperforming loans and declining col-
lateral values triggered a banking crisis,
with finance companies facing financial
difficulties first.- Some scholars claim
that financial losses first spilled over to
banks via their investments in finance
companies.82 In the early stages of the
Swedish financial crisis, losses on real es-
tate loans dominated, but losses eventu-
ally spread to other loans.83 Losses in
real estate loans were mirrored by steep
declines in real estate prices, which in
turn paralleled declines in bank share
prices.1 The worsening crisis led to the
Swedish government taking extraordi-
nary measures to guarantee bank loans
ternational Perspective, Remarks at the International Monetary Fund (Sept. 11, 2002), available at http://
www.imf.orglexternallnp/speeches/2002/091102.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2010).
Mr. Ingves said: "Another contributing cause to banking crisis is premature financial liberalization, to-
gether with inadequate preparation among bankers and supervisors. The former may not have the needed
skills to manage and price risk, and the latter may not be given adequate resources and competencies to
monitor the more complex new risks. This can easily create a situation with pure ignorance about the risks
involved among relevant parties. Not having a clue about what is going on is sometimes a much more impor-
tant cause of serious difficulties than the in academia so often discussed moral hazard." Id.
77. See Davis, supra note 41, at 256. See Jonung et al., supra note 35, at 49, 54. Cf Backstr6m, supra
note 16, at 130 ("Credit market deregulation in 1985 ... meant that monetary conditions became more expan-
sionary.")
78. Englund, supra note 38, at 88-89, 95-96. Cf Jonung, supra note 35, at 577 (describing general trend
of financial deregulation in Scandinavian countries triggering asset price booms). Other economists have found
no causal link between Swedish deregulation of financial institutions and a more general boom in consump-
tion. Jonas Agell & Lennart Berg, Does Financial Deregulation Cause a Consumption Boom?, 98 SCAND. J.
ECON. 579 (1996). Agell and Berg do note that their study does not consider whether deregulation might have
affected "investment patterns, asset choice and borrowing for commercial purposes." Id. at 597. For one dis-
senting view of the contribution of financial liberalization to the Sweidsh crisis see Massimiliano Rimarchi,
Financial Liberalization, Credit Boom and Recession: a Business Cycle Accounting Perspective for Sweden
(Dec. 8, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, paper for Univ. of Cambridge Fac. of Econ. Conf. on "Macroeconomic
and Financial Linkages: Theory and Practice"), available at http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/events/mafc/Rimarchi.
pdf. (last visited Sept. 10, 2009). Rimarchi concludes that bank deregulation did not loosen bank credit, did not
spur growth in asset markets, and did not contribute to the vulnerability of the Swedish economy to financial
crisis. Id. at 23.
79. Englund, supra note 38, at 95-96; Andersson & Viotti, supra note 76, at 72.
80. Drees & Pazarbasioglu, supra note 35, at 22-23. See generally Englund, supra note 38, at 89-92.
81. Drees & Pazarbasioglu, supra note 35, at 23; Englund, supra note 38, at 89-90.
82. Drees & Pazarbasioglu, supra note 35, at 23; Englund, supra note 38, at 90.
83. Drees & Pazarbasioglu, supra note 35, at 23.
84. See id., at 23.
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and bail out financial institutions, includ-
ing nationalizing two large banks.85
IV. Deregulation in the United
States and the Current Crisis
Sweden's experience with financial
institution deregulation fits the pas de
deux model fairly well. This fit leads to
the question of whether the same model
may explain the contribution of various
episodes of deregulation to the current
U.S. financial crisis. This Part IV
sketches out how the model might fit the
interactions, respectively, of: (a) govern-
ment sponsored entities and sponsors of
"private label" securitizations; (b) com-
mercial banks and investment banks
with respect to the repeal of the Glass-
Steagall division between those two cate-
gories of financial institutions; and (c)
banks and hedge funds and OTC deriva-
tives. This sketch is meant to provide a
framework for further econometric analy-
sis of the extent to which displacement or
subsidy leakage occurred after these
three episodes of deregulation and the ex-
tent to which displacement or subsidy
leakage contributed to the boom in the
housing and asset-backed securities mar-
kets and the vulnerability of financial in-
stitutions to a crash in those markets.
A number of economists have argued
that political capture and regulatory cap-
ture contributed to the deregulation of
the U.S. financial institutions in the last
several decades. According to these ac-
counts, consolidation of the financial ser-
vices sector led to concentrations of
political power that were able to push
deregulation through Congress and fed-
eral bureaucracy.6 This account of der-
egulation compliments the pas de deux
model of deregulation.
a. Government Sponsored
Entities and Private Label
Securitizations.
1. Two Categories of Financial Insti-
tutions: Congress chartered Freddie Mac
and Fannie Mae as privately owned com-
panies to create a liquid national market
for residential mortgages to promote in-
creased homeownership. 7 Before the fi-
nancial crisis, scholars debated whether
or not these two GSEs enjoyed an implicit
guarantee from the federal government of
their obligations in the event of their in-
solvency.8* The financial crisis culminat-
85. Id., at 29-30.
86. See generally SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KwAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE
NEXT FINANcIAL MELTDOWN 88-119 (2010). Cf The Future of Financial Services Regulation: Hearing Before
the H. Fin. Serv. Comm. 109th Cong. - (2008) (statement of Joseph E. Stiglitz). Professor Stiglitz argues that
"capture" needs to be broadly conceived: "Regulatory capture is not just a matter of 'buying' regulators, or even
of 'revolving doors,' but also of the capture of ideas and mindsets. If those who are supposed to regulate the
financial markets approach the problem from financial markets' perspectives, they will not provide an ade-
quate check and balance. But much of the inadequacy of current regulations and regulatory structures is the
result of financial markets' political influence, in many countries through campaign contributions." Id.
87. David Reiss, The Federal Government's Implied Guarantee of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's Obliga-
tions: Uncle Sam Will Pick Up the Tab, 42 GA. L. REV. 1019, 1028 (2008).
88. Compare Reiss, supra note 87 (arguing an implicit guarantee existed) with Richard Scott Carnell,
Handling the Failure of a Government-Sponsored Enterprise, 80 WASH. L. REV. 565 (2005). Professor Carnell
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ing with the government taking over the
GSEs in conservatorship settled the ar-
gument; the guarantee is no longer im-
plicit. 9 Beyond an implicit guarantee,
Freddie and Fannie enjoyed a raft of
other regulatory subsidies, including tax
exemptions, exemptions from various se-
curities laws, and laws granting special
status to GSE securities making them
equivalent to government securities (ena-
bling federal agencies, fiduciaries, and
federally regulated lenders to invest in
GSE securities).9o Moreover, Freddie and
Fannie were subject to weaker capital re-
quirements than other federally regu-
lated financial institutions, which
enabled them to take on more leverage
and hence more risk.9'
To fulfill their missions, Freddie and
Fannie engaged in two lines of business.
First, they (together with the Govern-
ment National Mortgage Association) pio-
neered the creation of mortgage-backed
securities. The two GSEs would
purchase pools of residential mortgages
of certain loan sizes that met certain
credit standards and other criteria ("con-
forming mortgages"). The future cash
streams from these mortgages would be
used to issue securities to investors that
Freddie and Fannie would guarantee.
Second, the GSEs purchased for their
own investment portfolios mortgages and
mortgaged-backed securities issued by
others. 92
The success of the GSEs in the first
line of business spawned copycats, as
other financial institutions entered the
mortgage-backed securities market in
several waves from the 1970s to the early
2000s. These financial institutions spon-
sored new issuances of residential mort-
gage-backed securities - in what are
called "private label" securitizations.
Freddie and Fannie retained a dominant
position in "conforming mortgages," while
the private label securitizations focused
on segments of the mortgage market fore-
closed to Freddie and Fannie by regula-
tion, including "jumbo" mortgages
(mortgages above a certain dollar thresh-
old) and riskier "subprime" mortgages
(mortgages to less creditworthy borrow-
ers). The sponsors of those private label
issuances did not benefit from the im-
plicit guarantee and other regulatory
subsidies enjoyed by Freddie and Fan-
nie.93
2. & 3. Push for Deregulation & Der-
egulation: In the case of Freddie and Fan-
nie, deregulation took the form of
government pressure for the two compa-
documented government disavowals of a guarantee and argued that the guarantee was more a matter of inves-
tor perception. Id. at 584.
89. For an analysis of the regulatory privileges enjoyed by the GSEs after Freddie and Fannie were
placed into conservatorship and taken over by the Federal government, see David J. Reiss, Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac and the Future of Federal Housing Finance Policy: A Study of Regulatory Privilege, 61 ALA. L.
REV. - (forthcoming 2009).
90. Reiss, supra note 87, at 1055-65.
91. Id. at 1065.
92. Id. at 1027-1033.
93. Id. at 1030-33 (describing private label securitizations), 1052-68 (describing unique regulatory privi-
leges enjoyed by GSEs).
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nies to loosen their standards for their re-
spective retained investment portfolios to
allow them to purchase higher risk "sub-
prime" mortgages in which low-income
individuals were the borrowers.94 Fred-
die and Fannie purchased these riskier
mortgages in response to profits enjoyed
by Wall Street banks that were using
similar mortgages to back private label
securitizations. Although Freddie and
Fannie retained dominance in the con-
forming mortgage market, regulations
had prevented them from participating in
the surging profits of the subprime mort-
gage market.9 5 Press accounts describe
the pressure that the chief executive of
Fannie Mae was under in 2004 to allow
his company to purchase riskier mort-
gages from mortgage lenders:
"...[H]is company was under siege. Com-
petitors were snatching away lucrative
parts of its business. Congress was de-
manding that Mr. Mudd help steer more
loans to low-income borrowers. Lenders
were threatening to sell directly to Wall
Street unless Fannie bought a bigger
chunk of their riskiest loans.""
One scholar dates the decision of the
GSEs to lower their purchasing stan-
dards to the 1990s, and attributes the de-
cision to political pressure from Congress,
the Executive Branch, and the U.S. De-
partment of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment." Other accounts fault the George
W. Bush Administration; animated by a
belief in free markets and the importance
of encouraging home ownership, that Ad-
ministration pursued a broad set of regu-
latory initiatives to stimulate mortgage
lending.98 These policies included the
President pushing Freddie Mac and Fan-
nie Mae to increase support of lending to
low-income borrowers." On the same
94. Binyamin Appelbaum, How Washington Failed to Rein in Fannie, Freddie, WASH. POST, Sept. 14,
2008, at Al.
95. See id. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. Christopher L. Peterson, Fannie Mae, Freddie
Mac, and the Home Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis, 10 LOYOLA J. PuB. INTEREST L. 149, 161-65 (2009). Professor
Chris Peterson describes the competition from private label securitizations giving rise to abusive mortgage
lending practices:
By the 1990s, the private label securitization market specializing in subprime mortgages, jumbo
mortgages, and an expanding array of alternative mortgage products with non-amortizing features
were rapidly capturing market share from more traditional GSEs. With the new access to large pools
of capital, unscrupulous and thinly capitalized mortgage brokers and lenders began to aggressively
market a new crop of questionable subprime and manufactured home mortgage loans. Legal aid
attorneys, consumer advocates, and the press began to see an increase in the volume of what
America would come to call predatory mortgages.
Id. at 160.
96. Charles Duhigg, Pressured to Take More Risk, Fannie Reached a Tipping Point, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 5,
2008 at Al.
97. Richard E. Mendales, The Fall and Rise of Fannie and Freddie: Securitization After the Meltdown, 42
U.C.C. L.J. 33, _ (forthcoming 2009) citing Carol D. Leonnig, How HUD Mortgage Policy Fed the Crisis,
WASH. PosT, June 10, 2008, at Al; Steven A. Holmes, Fannie Mae Eases Credit to Aid Mortgage Lending, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 30, 1999 at C2; Stephen Labaton, New Agency Proposed to Oversee Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2003 at Cl; Charles W. Calomiris & Peter J. Wallison, Blame Fannie Mae and Congress
for the Credit Mess, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2008 at A29.
98. Jo Becker et al., White House Philosophy Stoked Mortgage Bonfire, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2008 at Al.
99. Id.
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day that the head of the federal agency
that regulated Freddie and Fannie issued
a report outlining the risk that those
firms could default on their obligations
and spark a market crisis, the White
House attempted to fire him.100 Only
later did the Administration join with
certain members of Congress in a failed
legislative attempt to impose stricter reg-
ulations on Freddie and Fannie.101
At the same time that Congress and
the White House were pressuring Fred-
die and Fannie, those firms were also us-
ing extensive lobbying efforts to thwart
attempts to regulate them.102 This tan-
gled web of political lobbying by the GSEs
and pressure from the Executive and
Legislative Branches makes it difficult to
determine the extent to which decisions
to lower GSE investment standards to
participate in the subprime mortgage
market were pushed by Freddie and Fan-
nie or, alternatively, were pushed on
these firms by their overseers.103
4. & 5. Deregulation Enables In-
creased Lending & Asset Market Boom:
Whether because of competitive or politi-
cal pressure, Freddie and Fannie dramat-
ically increased their direct purchases of
riskier "subprime" and "alt-A" mortgages.
They also increased their investments in
private label asset-backed securities, in-
cluding securities backed by those same
two riskier mortgage classes.104 These
twin moves open up the possibility that
the deregulation of Freddie and Fannie
described above resulted in both displace-
ment and subsidy leakage. Displacement
would occur if GSEs, competing to
purchase risky mortgages, pushed pri-
vate label securitizations into purchasing
even riskier mortgages. Subsidy leakage
would occur as GSE purchases of private
label asset-backed securities fueled fur-
ther growth of private label securitiza-
tions. A very cursory examination of data
on both subprime mortgages and assets
does reveal a marked increase in the
number of subprime mortgages being un-
derwritten by mortgage lenders in 2004.
The following chart105 reveals a 2004
spike in both the volume of subprime
mortgages and their percentage share of
all mortgage originations in the United
States.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Duhigg, supra note 96, at Al; Appelbaum, supra note 94, at Al.
103. Some accounts of the decision at Fannie to expand purchases of subprime mortgages focus on man-
agement making the decision because of competitive pressures rather than responding to political pressure.
E.g., Damon Silvers & Heather Slavkin, The Legacy of Deregulation and the Financial Crisis: Linkages be-
tween Deregulation in Labor Markets, Housing Finance Markets, and the Broader Financial Markets, 4 J. Bus.
& TECH. L. 301, 326-27 (2009).
104. Peterson, supra note 95, at 163.
105. George Selgin, Guilty as Charged, THE INDEPENDENT INSTITUTE (Nov. 7, 2008), available at http://
www.independent.org/publications/article.asp?id=2368 (last visited Feb. 1, 2010).
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Assuming the supply of subprime
mortgages was elastic, the new purchases
of these mortgages by Freddie and Fan-
nie would be expected to dramatically in-
crease the number of these mortgages.
However, detailed econometric studies
are needed to determine a more precise
causal link between new GSE purchases
of subprime mortgages and private label
mortgage-backed-securities starting in
2004 and this surge in subprime origina-
tions.
6. Crisis: Freddie and Fannie's in-
vestments in subprime mortgages and as-
set-backed securities based on those
mortgages proved catastrophic. When
the subprime crisis accelerated, defaults
on subprime mortgages and resultant
losses on private label asset-backed se-
curities increased and damaged the fi-
nancial health of the GSEs. Freddie and
Fannie's thin capitalization meant losses
on their retained portfolios were devas-
tating. 106
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106. See Peterson, supra note 95, at 164-67.
107. For a concise, incisive account of the history and rationale of the Glass-Steagall Act, see Joseph Jude
Norton, Up Against "The Wall": Glass-Steagall and the Dilemma of a Deregulated ("Reregulated") Banking
Environment, 42 Bus. LAw 327 (1987).
108. Walter, supra note 4, at 2-7.
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b. Commercial and Investment
Banks and the Glass-Steagall
Repeal.
1. Two Categories of Financial Insti-
tutions: The pas de deux model can also
be applied to analyze the contribution of
the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act to the
severity of the current crisis. The Glass-
Steagall Act was a Depression-era federal
law that circumscribed the permissible
business and investment activities of
commercial banks. Glass-Steagall has
been broadly characterized as creating a
wall between commercial banks and in-
vestments banks.10 7 After this division,
many commercial banks could receive
government deposit insurance, the ability
to borrow funds through the Federal Re-
serve's discount window, access to the
Federal Reserve's clearing services, and
other regulatory privileges that could
theoretically grant banks a subsidy.10 In
turn, banks faced numerous restrictions
on their investment activities designed to
curtail their risk taking and the moral
hazard that accompanied government in-
surance. Investment banks, by contrast,
could not obtain deposit insurance, but
could engage in lucrative activities in-
cluding making equity investments and
engaging in proprietary trading.
2. & 3. Push for Deregulation & Der-
egulation: By the 1980s, many banks be-
came attracted to the profits that
investment banks earned through these
NEXUS
investment businesses. These profits
(and the prospects of creating financial
conglomerates that could offer retail and
business customers an array of financial
products through "'one-stop shopping")
led banks and other financial institutions
to call for dismantling the Glass-Steagall
divide. 09 The entire story of the repeal of
Glass-Steagall by the Gramm Leach
Bliley Act is beyond the scope of this arti-
cle. However, as repeal was being de-
bated, economists did consider the
dangers of repealing Glass-Steagall lead-
ing to displacement or subsidy leakage
(even if those terms were not used). A se-
ries of studies conducted while the repeal
was being debated analyzed whether de-
positary banks would gain an unfair ad-
vantage when competing with other
financial institutions by virtue of a sub-
sidy implicit in bank deposit insurance
and banks' unique access to the Federal
Reserve's discount window and clearing
services. This unfair advantage arguably
might lower a bank's cost of funds below
market value. Reassured by a federal
safety net, a bank's debt holders might
permit the bank to operate with lower
capital and take on more risk."xo
Several studies concluded that this
risk was remote; these studies estimated
that the subsidy of deposit insurance was
negligible or even negative due to offset-
ting costs of banking regulations, includ-
ing deposit insurance premiums and
capital and reserve requirements."'
Other scholars concluded that, even if
banks did enjoy a net subsidy, banking
109. Jonathan Macey argued that the principal rationale for the Gramm Leach Bliley Act was that tech-
nological developments had made commercial banking obsolete and that commercial banks should be thus
allowed to enter more profitable investment banking businesses. Jonathan R. Macey, The Business of Bank-
ing: Before and After Gramm-Leach Bliley, 25 J. CORP. L. 691, 691-93 (2000). Professor Macey went on to
dispute this rationale, arguing that banks could remain profitable and that the repeal of Glass-Steagall was
nevertheless justified on other grounds. He argued that combining commercial and investment banking opera-
tions would allow financial institutions to realize synergies and achieve diversification. Id. at 693-94.
For an account of the debate over the repeal of Glass-Steagall, see Wilmarth, supra note 16, at 972-75.
Professor Wilmarth explains how in the years preceding the repeal of Glass-Steagall, bank regulators had
increasingly "opened loopholes in the Glass-Steagall wall in response to competitive pressures in the financial
marketplace." Id. at 972. Ultimately, the Federal Reserve Board allowed Citicorp, a large bank holding com-
pany, to merge with Travelers, a financial conglomerate that included insurance and securities subsidiaries in
violation of the express prohibitions of the Act. Id. at 972-73. This threw down the gauntlet to Congress to
either repeal Glass-Steagall or force the breakup of this megamerger of financial institutions. Id.
110. Frederick Furlong, Federal Subsidies in Banking: the Link to Financial Modernization, 97 FED. RES.
BANK S.F. ECON. LETTER 1 (1997).
111. Kenneth Jones & Barry Kolatch, The Federal Safety Net, Banking Subsidies, and Implications for
Financial Modernization, 12 F.D.I.C. BANKING REv. 1, 15 (1999) ("most evidence suggests that the net margi-
nal subsidy received by these banks is insignificant or even negative."); Gary Whalen, Bank Organizational
Form and the Risks of Expanded Activities, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Econ. Working Paper 97-
1 (Jan. 1997), available at http://www.comptrollerofthecurrency.gov/ftp/workpaper/97-1.pdf (last visited Jan. 5,
2010); Gary Whalen, The Competitive Implications of Safety Net-Related Subsidies, Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency Econ. Working Paper 97-9 (1997) available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/wp97-9.htm (last visited
Jan. 5, 2010).
For a survey of studies from 1984 to 1993 that found banks enjoyed no subsidy or a small subsidy, see
Walter, supra note 4, at 3-5. One study showed that risky banks did enjoy a subsidy after the FDIC began
charging variable risk-adjusted premia for deposit insurance in 1993. Id. citing T.W. Epps et al., Assessing the
FDIC?s Premium and Examination Policies Using Soviet Put Options, 20 J. BANKING FIN. 699 (1996).
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regulations under Gramm Leach Bliley
Act would prevent banks from passing
the subsidy to other affiliates.112 Among
other things, the Act allowed banks to be
part of financial holding companies,
which could engage in wide range of non-
banking businesses including insurance,
securities underwriting, and investment
banking, but still prohibited the bank
subsidiaries of the holding companies
from engaging in many of these activities
that were prohibited by Glass-Steagall.113
In addition, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley pro-
hibited the FDIC from providing assis-
tance (or bailing out) to a bank's non-
banking affiliates and subsidiaries (but
this raises the question of whether bail-
ing out a bank would still indirectly bene-
fit its affiliates). 11
Other banking scholars expressed
reservations with these conclusions that
banks do not enjoy a net subsidy and cau-
tioned that deregulation must be care-
fully conducted to mitigate the risk of
subsidies existing." 5 At least one study
found that banks did enjoy a subsidy and
bank holding companies organized their
operations to take advantage of cheaper
costs of funding inside their bank subsidi-
aries.116
This scholarly debate reveals that
whether banks enjoy a subsidy depends,
in part, on whether bank regulations are
strict enough to counter any moral haz-
ard associated with a government guar-
antee. For example, appropriately
calibrated deposit insurance premiums
and vigilant regulatory policing of bank
risk-taking would negate a subsidy.
Since deposit insurance premiums, other
bank regulations, and the level of regula-
tory enforcement can all change over
time (or can fail to adjust to changes in
bank risk-taking), the question of
whether banks enjoy a subsidy is a dy-
namic one. For example, one of the ways
in which regulators counteract the moral
hazard associated with deposit insurance
is by charging banks a premium for this
insurance.1 1 7 Ideally, the amount of the
premium should vary according to the
risk of a bank's operations. But, if premi-
ums do not appropriate adjust for risk,
then moral hazard is not completely off-
112. James R. Barth et al., Policy Watch: The Repeal of Glass-Steagall and the Advent of Broad Banking,
14 J. EcoN. PERSP. 191, 199-200 (2000).
113. Id.; Professor Wilmarth expressed skepticism as to whether these firewalls established by Gramm-
Leach-Bliley would prevent banks from cross-subsidizing non-bank affiliates. Wilmarth, supra note 28, at 446-
49.
114. Barth et al., supra note 112, at 199 n. 5. Arthur Wilmarth argued that, despite the express provi-
sions of Gramm-Leach Bliley, regulators could not credibly restrict the federal safety net to banks because
large financial conglomerates enjoyed "too-big-too-fail" status. See Wilmarth, supra note 28, at 446-449.
115. Furlong, supra note 110; Bernard Shull & Lawrence J. White, Of Firewalls and Subsidiaries: the
Right Stuff for Expanded Bank Activities, NYU Center for Law and Business Working Paper #CLB-98-017 12-
13 (Feb. 1998), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=164498 (last visited Jan. 5,
2010).
116. Myron L. Kwast & S. Wayne Passmore, The Subsidy Provided by the Federal Safety Net: Theory and
Evidence, 17 J. FIN. SERV. REs. 125 (2000).
117. McCoy, supra note 25, at 428. See also Viral V. Acharya et al., Systemic Risk and Deposit Insurance
Premiums, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. PoL'Y REV. - (forthcoming), available at http://www.nyfedeconomists.
org/research/epr/forthcoming/0908acha.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2010).
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set"1 and subsidy leakage or displace-
ment can occur. As one illustration of
how bank subsidies may change over
time, one of the co-authors of a 2000
study that concluded bank subsidies
under Gramm Leach Bliley were not
problematic (if they even existed), co-au-
thored a 2003 study that concluded that
subsequent regulatory changes led to
banks enjoying increased subsidies."19
4. & 5. Deregulation Enables In-
creased Lending &
Asset Market Boom: The variability of
the bank subsidy argues for new studies
to determine whether the repeal of Glass-
Steagall resulted in either:
displacement of non-bank financial
institutions into riskier market seg-
ments, or subsidy leakage, by which
banks conferred a subsidy onto non-bank-
ing subsidiaries and enabled those sub-
sidiaries to take on excessive risk.
It is clear that the repeal of Glass-
Steagall was followed by a wave of merg-
ers and acquisitions involving banks and
securities firms, which added fuel to an
already swelling wave of financial indus-
try consolidation. 12 0 Arthur Wilmarth ar-
gues that the repeal of Glass-Steagall
contributed to the creation of large finan-
cial conglomerates that were responsible
for an unsustainable credit boom in the
United States in the last two decades.121
He links the removal of Glass-Steagall
barriers to explosive growth in securities
underwriting that fueled the stock mar-
ket boom of the late 1990s. 122 He writes:
". .the relaxation and removal of Glass-
Steagall barriers enabled large commer-
cial banks to become major players in the
investment banking business after 1990.
Intensifying competition between com-
mercial banks and securities firms stimu-
lated a spectacular growth in the issuance
of corporate securities during the late
1990s ... The onrush of newly-issued se-
curities contributed to a stock market
boom from 1994 to 2000, comparable to
the great bull market of 1923 to 1929.123
This bull market ultimately crashed at
the turn of the century, 'representing the
larges percentage drop in stock values
since the stock market's collapse between
1929 and 1932.'l124
Professor Wilmarth similarly faults
large financial conglomerates for contrib-
uting to the subprime housing boom and
subsequent financial crisis through fos-
tering the origination of risky subprime
consumer mortgages and other loans, the
securitization of those loans (the private
label securitizations described above),
and the development of OTC derivatives
118. Walter, supra note 4, at 2; McCoy, supra note 25, at 428-30; Acharya, supra note 117.
119. Cf Barth et al., supra note 112, at 199 ("Even if there were net marginal subsidies from the federal
safety net that accrued to banks, adequate safeguards appear to exist to inhibit banks from passing them
through to other, affiliated subsidiaries. . .") with Joe Peek & James A. Wilcox, The Fall and Rise of Banking
Safety Net Subsidies, in Too-BIG-To-FAIL: POLICIES AND PRACTICES (Benton Gup ed., 2003). The latter study
concludes: . . . "safety net subsidies appear now to have risen noticeably since the middle of the 1990s. Condi-
tions and public policies may also be paving the way for banking safety net subsidies to rise further in the first
decade of the new millennium." Id. at 30.
120. Wilmarth, supra note 16, at 975-77.
121. Id. at 1002-1046.
122. Id. at 997-98.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 998.
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to further transfer the risk of consumer
loans.125
6. Crisis: Wilmarth then traces how
these devices and the financial conglom-
erates that spawned them became the
catalysts for the global financial crisis.12 6
The questions posed by the pas de deux
model are whether displacement and sub-
sidy leakage in the wake of the Glass-
Steagall repeal contributed to the in-
creased risk taking of these financial in-
stitutions. More particularly, did the
entry of commercial banks into the in-
vestment banking business push invest-
ment banks into riskier investments?
One pattern to watch for in data is
whether investment banks not affiliated
with depository banks began making
riskier investments than financial hold-
ing companies with both investment
bank and depository bank affiliates soon
after those holding companies formed or
after their affiliates entered a market in
which investment banks were already op-
erating. A broader question also bears
examination: did bank holding companies
use any subsidies to bank subsidiaries to
fund risk-taking by other subsidiaries
notwithstanding the safeguards built into
the Gramm Leach Bliley Act?
c. Banks and Hedge Funds and
OTC Derivatives.
The pas de deux model might also be
used to frame research into a third, sub-
tler area of deregulation involving banks
and OTC derivative investments. Profes-
sor Saule Omarova has authored a fasci-
nating study of how banks, enticed by the
profits of derivatives trading, pursued a
deregulatory campaign for over a dec-
ade.127 This campaign focused on con-
vincing the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency to change gradually its reg-
ulatory interpretations of what consti-
tutes the "business of banking" to allow
banks to engage in derivatives trades.128
The application of the pas de deux model
is somewhat rougher here. The dual clas-
ses of financial institutions would consist
of: I banks on the one hand, which enjoy
deposit protection and other regulatory
subsidies ,129 but were previously con-
strained in derivatives trading by federal
law that defined the "business of bank-
ing"13o (banks remain subject to other reg-
ulatory burdens such as capital
requirements, but deregulation has also
dialed down these regulatory burdens);'13
and I other financial institutions, on the
other hand, that were not so restricted
125. Id. at 1015-1046.
126. Id., at 1043-46.
127. Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed the "Business of Banking,"
63 MiAi L. REV. 1041 (forthcoming 2009).
128. Id.
129. Wilmarth, supra note 28, at 335-337 (arguing that banks enjoy regulatory subsidies when they
engage in OTC derivative dealing, including "federal safety net protections" and enhanced reputation and
credibility).
130. Omarova, supra note 127, at 1055.
131. Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: the Outsourcing of Financial Regulation to Risk
Models and the Global Financial Crisis, 84 WASH. L. REV. 127, 155-57 (2009) (describing bank capital require-
ments and how those requirements were effectively loosened by the Basel II bank accord).
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and thus could earn additional profits on
derivatives trading.132
Hedge funds represent a clear exam-
ple of institutions that fit under the sec-
ond category. These unregulated entities
could trade in derivatives without regula-
tory encumbrance.'3 If the pas de deux
model fits this example of deregulation, it
is likely that it resulted in subsidy leak-
age rather than displacement. This is be-
cause freeing banks to engage in
derivatives traded created a symbiotic re-
lationship between banks and hedge
funds. Banks benefit from having hedge
funds as counter parties; lacking regula-
tory restrictions on risk-taking, hedge
funds could take on more risk, particu-
larly by selling credit protection in credit
derivatives.'3 4 Banks on the other hand
enjoy a cheap cost of capital and
presented a lower degree of counterparty
risk thanks to deposit insurance and gov-
ernment regulation.135 Through their
global networks of customer relation-
ships, banks were able to connect hedge
funds to other firms seeking to enter into
derivative transactions. 36 (Aside from
banking, subsidy leakage may explain
how AIG became such an important
player in the credit derivative market
that ultimately brought that heavily reg-
ulated and subsidized insurance com-
pany to its knees in the financial crisis.)
Derivatives, particularly credit deriv-
atives, likely played an important role in
the boom of the housing and asset-backed
securities market. Credit derivatives al-
lowed investors to offload risk from in-
vesting in mortgages and asset-backed
securities. With this risk spread to other
parties, investors could invest additional
money in mortgages and asset-backed se-
curities with the proceeds ultimately
flowing back as additional credit to mort-
gage borrowers. Additional credit may
fuel housing price increases. This con-
nection among mortgages, mortgage-
backed and other asset-backed securities,
and credit derivatives has been called the
"shadow banking system."'
132. See id., at 133, 161-62 (describing hedge funds as counterparties to OTC derivatives and efforts to
regulate those funds).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. The potential for a government subsidy of banks is discussed above. See supra notes 110-119 and
accompanying text. See also Wilmarth, supra note 28, at 336-37. Professor Wilmarth describes the potential
for subsidy leakage in the context of banks and OTC derivatives in the following passage: This presence of a
federal "safety net" for top derivatives dealers creates a clear conflict of interest between those dealers and the
responsible federal agencies. Derivative dealers have a strong temptation to exploit the federal safety net's
implicit subsidy by engaging in speculative trading, unless regulators can accurately monitor trading activities
and impose effective sanctions for excessive risk-taking. Id. at 353.
136. Cf. Wilmarth supra note 28, at 332-37 (describing how banks have assumed position of major global
OTC derivative dealers).
137. Tobias Adrian & Hyun Song Shin, The Shadow Banking System: Implications for Financial Regula-
tion, N.Y. Fed. Res. Bank Staff Report No. 382 (July 2009); Margaret M. Blair & Erik F. Gerding, Sometimes
Too Great a Notional: Measuring the "Systemic Significance" of OTC Credit Derivatives, LOMBARD STREET,
August 31, 2009, at 10, 10.
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V. Conclusion
As noted above empirical research is
needed to determine the extent to which
displacement and subsidy leakage con-
tributed to the current financial crisis.
Findings of either phenomenon would
lend support to the still vague Volcker
Rule proposed by the Obama Administra-
tion, which appears to be intended to
limit the ability of banks to use govern-
ment insured funds to engage in riskier
investments.13 But the pas de deux
model also suggests that a prohibition on
profitable bank investments - such as the
Volcker Rule - would inevitably come
under increasing political pressure over
time, as banks would lose valuable profit
opportunities to less encumbered finan-
cial institutions. Banks would then ei-
ther seek "workarounds" for the Volcker
Rule or push for deregulation.
Beyond this immediate policy appli-
cation, the pas de deux model has two
more general policy implications. First,
the model suggests that policymakers re-
alize the inherent economic and political
instability of creating dual classes of fi-
nancial institutions - one class that is
subsidized and regulated and another
that is not. Second, the model argues
that regulators must take great care
when deregulation would allow a subsi-
dized class of financial institution to com-
pete with an unsubsidized class in the
same loan and investment markets. Reg-
ulators must neutralize the possibility of
subsidy leakage. This may mean con-
vincing the marketplace that the govern-
ment is no longer providing a guarantee
of the deregulated class. But it may be
impossible or inadvisable to remove
many government guarantees. For ex-
ample, many economists, including
Milton Friedman, believe that govern-
ment insurance of bank deposits may
play a valuable role in staving off bank
runs.13 9 If subsidies cannot be removed,
regulators must calibrate the use of other
banking regulations - deposit insurance
premiums, capital requirements, reserve
requirements, and inspection and en-
forcement - to counter the subsidy. Ef-
forts, such as in the Gramm Leach Bliley
Act,140 to cabin the subsidy through divi-
sions between affiliates of financial con-
glomerates will, however, be under
constant pressure; creative lawyering
will work to undermine these regulatory
efforts. Again, legal separations between
classes of financial institutions will be
hard to sustain politically in the face of a
less regulated class earning consistently
higher profits.
Beyond immediate policy debates,
this article calls for further historical and
empirical research as to whether the
model described above can explain other
episodes of deregulation and financial cri-
sis. The interaction of banks and "jusen"
(a category of home mortgage lending
company) during Japan's real estate bub-
138. Supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
139. MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1867-1960
441-42 (1963); Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J.
POL. ECON. 401 (1983).
140. Supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
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ble in the 1980s might prove a useful test
for the model.141 Examination of exam-
ples of dual classes of financial institu-
tions that operated in similar market
spaces but which did not lead to deregu-
lation, an investment boom, or financial
crisis would also prove invaluable for
testing the model. In fact, counterexam-
ples could yield answers to important
questions. For example, under what con-
ditions do dual classes of financial insti-
tutions result in deregulation of the more
regulated class as opposed to heavier reg-
ulation of the less-regulated class?
Under what conditions does a regulatory
division between dual classes remain sta-
ble? For cases in which deregulation of a
more regulated class did not lead to a
lending boom, why not? Did regulators
take action to negate subsidy leakage or
displacement? Further study of the
model in this article may thus shed light
on larger questions of when legal or regu-
latory arbitrage is most effective at un-
dermining boundaries between types of
financial firms.
More broadly, the pas de deux model
provides an example of the value of inte-
grating models of economics and political
economy. Integrated models can illumi-
nate the various political and economic
pressures that change regulation -
whether of financial institutions or other-
wise - over time. Efforts to design an op-
timal framework for regulation must
contend with a dynamic political, eco-
nomic, and legal environment that may
require constant adaptation by regula-
tors. * * *
162
141. For an introduction to the jusen crisis, see Curtis J. Milhaupt & Geoffrey P. Miller, Regulatory
Failure and the Collapse of Japan's Home Mortgage Lending Industry: a Legal and Economic Analysis, 22 L. &
PoL'Y 245 (2000).
